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SUMMARY
Innovative clean technologies are part of the solution to reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions in both Canada and Alberta, particularly in the latter’s petroleum 
industry. However, while governments and their agencies may provide policies 
and financial support, proponents of cleantech still face numerous barriers to 
full deployment and commercialization. 
To navigate the innovation and funding process successfully, it’s crucial for 
proponents to know the factors that impact the effective commercialization 
of cleantech innovations. They must also understand the role policies play in 
either supporting or hindering favourable outcomes. 
Start-ups require support that focuses on innovation with a strong commercial 
potential, while scale-ups need to rely on proven strengths if they want to 
obtain private sector support for growth. Granting agencies and governments 
have an important role in supporting innovation. More clearly demonstrating 
and communicating their due diligence around funding decisions justifies 
expenditure of public money. Moreover, their decisions can and should send 
a signal to private sector financiers whether a certain innovation represents 
a good investment. Due diligence equally works to signal financiers when a 
specific project does not merit investment.
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The need to find innovative solutions to reducing emissions may seem pressing, 
but the race should not be to the swiftest. De-risking for commercialization means 
that a proponent must firmly establish that the technology works, is economically 
feasible and can attain sufficient market penetration for a return on investment to the 
prospective financier, as well as provide socio-economic and environmental benefits.
Trying to simplify or speed up the stages of innovation and the funding process means 
proponents can be exposed to incompletely proven and riskier technologies, which can 
damage credibility with financiers. A balance must be struck between the financier’s 
wish to expedite the de-risking process and the need to avoid inadequate de-risking 
which can jeopardize the project and its funding at a later stage.
Distinctions must also be made between firm-level support, which allows a company 
more flexibility in pursuing or cancelling projects, and project-level supports, in which 
the funding is specifically targeted for use in the development of a particular innovation 
and has a defined end point.
Cleantech innovation in Alberta faces added hurdles associated with a post-2014 
economic downturn that has reduced some firms’ cash flows and has made firms, as 
well as government, less inclined to support cleantech innovations. This situation makes 
it crucial for innovation proponents seeking funding to distinguish clearly between 
a proposed project’s economic and environmental benefits. A technology whose 
primary benefit is reducing emissions is susceptible to changes in emissions pricing 
or regulations, and thus is not an attractive candidate for investors. An innovation 
that primarily reduces costs but offers a secondary environmental benefit is a better 
investment because it is much less sensitive to policy changes. 
Alberta innovators must make sure they emphasize the economic benefits, and 
do their due diligence and careful de-risking if they want to surmount the added 
obstacles. Cleantech innovation doesn’t have to become a casualty of the provincial 




Part of the solution to reducing emissions in Alberta and Canada — and in the 
petroleum industry specifically — is innovative clean technologies. Proponents of these 
technologies, however, face barriers to full-scale deployment and commercialization, 
even with policy and financial support from government and government agencies. 
Given the challenge and scale required to reduce emissions in Alberta’s petroleum 
industry,1 there is a need to better understand the transition in clean technology 
(cleantech) development projects from inception, through deployment and final 
commercialization. Effectively supporting innovation requires knowledge of (1) the 
factors critical to effective commercialization and (2) how policy supports and hinders 
favourable outcomes in cleantech. We review the regulatory, economic, financial and 
policy environment for cleantech in Alberta, focusing on the petroleum industry, and 
identify challenges and barriers that cleantech proponents face.
Throughout this analysis, we maintain a broad and intentionally vague definition 
of cleantech as any innovation that supports improved environmental outcomes 
(although we have a particular interest in projects that focus on reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions from the petroleum industry). Innovation is distinct from (albeit related 
to) the concept of creativity. Creativity is the imaginative conceptualization of a 
new technology or process, whereas innovation is the practical implementation of 
a new technology or process. Our focus is on projects as an innovation process — 
how ideas and projects are (or are not) developed and implemented for ultimate 
commercialization — rather than ideas as a creative output.
In identifying critical factors for effective commercialization, we reviewed existing 
literature and investigated publicly available information for a sample of late-stage 
emissions-reduction technologies at various phases of deployment in Alberta’s oil and 
gas sector.2 We reviewed this sample of technologies in order to gain general insights 
about cleantech innovation, though our research is not a case study approach to 
barriers to cleantech. We describe common themes identified in academic literature on 
barriers to commercialization of innovations in cleantech in general and verified these 
themes through informal discussions with subject matter experts.
We identify three themes that can improve cleantech innovation and supporting policy 
in Alberta and Canada’s petroleum industry: 
Due diligence and de-risking. An unmeasured rush to faster paced or expedited 
innovation processes is likely to be detrimental. Due diligence and de-risking are 
necessary for successful innovation; myopically pursuing an expedited process 
1 
Canadian 2018 emissions from oil and gas (upstream and downstream) were 193 Mt CO2-equivalent, or 26  
per cent of Canada’s total (ECCC 2020). Alberta’s oil and gas emissions were 138.9 Mt, 51 per cent of the 
province’s total emissions, 72 per cent of Canadian oil and gas emissions and 19 per cent of total Canadian 
emissions.
2 
We summarise the six technologies in Table 1 in the appendix. Emissions Reduction Alberta staff 
recommended these specific technologies; all at one point were part of the funding portfolio of Emissions 
Reduction Alberta.
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can lead to cutting corners and exposes proponents to incompletely proved 
(and hence riskier) technologies in later stages of innovation.
Funding Sources. All players in the cleantech innovation space must recognize 
the importance of non-dilutive funding. Government grants are often treated as 
“dumb money” by private investors; however, grants are generally accompanied 
by a significant amount of due diligence. Communicating this due diligence as a 
signal to investors should be a priority, both for projects deemed to have merit 
and for those that are not (positive and negative signals are both important in 
building investor confidence for investment in meritorious innovation). Further 
to this, innovation proponents (particularly those outside of existing incumbent 
firms) prefer non-dilutive funding at earlier stages as it allows them to 
maintain control over their projects. Moreover, due diligence works both ways. 
Proponents who control and manage spending responsibly can and should 
document this as a signal to later-stage financiers.
Innovation Processes. More thought is needed on the distinction between firm-
level supports and project-level supports. Supporting innovation at the firm level 
means the firm can be more flexible: pursuing potentially fruitful innovations and 
cancelling projects as soon as it becomes clear they will not be successful without 
forfeiting a source of financing. Funding agencies and policymakers should be 
aware of this critical difference in incentives between firm vs. project supports.
Prior to discussing specific insights into the factors determining effective 
commercialization of cleantech in Alberta’s petroleum industry, we review two critical 
pieces of context. First, defining “effective commercialization.” Second, describing 
general features of innovation financing, as these decisions are key to projects’ success 
in successive steps towards commercialization. We then turn to key factors affecting 
access to financing for Alberta’s cleantech, followed by conclusions with a more 
detailed summary of the themes outlined above.
DEFINING EFFECTIVE COMMERCIALIZATION
Not all innovation is good or desirable. Innovations that lead to negative returns on 
investment, fail to deliver sufficient environmental benefits or reduce the market value 
of the underlying resources are not desirable. We define “effective commercialization” 
and “favourable outcomes” using the socio-economic concept of “efficiency.” With this 
definition, an efficient commercialized innovation is a private sector development and 
deployment that delivers social benefits that are higher than the social costs incurred 
in the commercialization process (positive net social benefits).3 Social benefits include 
both the return on investment to the private interests in the innovation program as well 
as any additional benefits (such as reduced environmental impacts) that accrue to the 
3 
Innovation outcomes that are provided primarily through public government funding fall outside our definition 
of “commercialization” since the term, commonly defined, implies a private financial return on an investment.
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rest of society.4 Social costs include both the costs borne by private interests in the 
innovation program as well as any costs borne by the rest of society. Benefits beyond 
those realized by private interests that accrue to society are “positive externalities,” 
while costs beyond those incurred by private interests that are borne by society are 
“negative externalities.”
Based on this definition, governments should not blindly encourage all innovation, 
but rather should attempt to support socio-economically efficient innovation projects 
and discourage socio-economically inefficient projects. This implies two distinct, but 
related, policy goals. The first is to help identify and promote financing for efficient 
projects while screening out inefficient projects. The second is to promote actions that 
can turn inefficient projects into efficient ones where possible.
Market economies provide less innovation than is optimal because of the public-good 
nature of knowledge (Bloom et al. 2016). That is, because an innovator cannot capture 
the entire value of an innovation, there will always be larger net social benefits than 
there are net private benefits. It is likely that this problem is worse in the petroleum 
industry (in the absence of any large negative externalities) because the additional 
presence of resource royalties further inflates the social benefit relative to the private 
benefit. Through the royalty formula, provincial governments receive a share of the 
value of any resource produced. Thus, if an innovation increases the value of the 
resource or contributes to an expansion in production, an added social benefit accrues 
to the public (through government collection of royalties). 
Environmental benefits are an additional social benefit that accrues to the public 
through improvements to environmental outcomes (relative to a baseline). This benefit 
is important for motivating the potential use of public funds (subsidies) on cleantech in 
the petroleum industry. The existence of other policies is important here, particularly 
those related to emissions regulation (implicit costs) or pricing (explicit costs). The 
presence of emissions pricing helps to align the private and social benefits of an 
emissions-reducing innovation. We will return to this point below.
In the interests of a comprehensive definition of “effective commercialization” it is 
worth acknowledging that exporting intellectual property via something like a formal 
licensing agreement should be considered an effective commercial outcome (if it 
is accompanied by a positive social return). There are potentially significant private 
benefits from exporting or licensing intellectual property related to oil and gas 
cleantech innovations that are developed domestically and sold to operators in 
4 
Who is included in society, called the reference group, determines the size and scope of social benefits and 
costs.
5
other jurisdictions. It follows that potential cleantech investors may be interested in 
supporting not just product development, but process development.5
FEATURES OF INNOVATION FINANCING
Absent persistent support from government funding, the ultimate determinant of 
success or failure of full-scale deployment of an innovation is the ability to access 
sufficient private capital to fund commercial development. A project’s net private 
benefit (the return to investment spending for a project) is critical in any discussion 
of commercialization. For cleantech innovation in the petroleum industry, as with 
any industry, financing is required throughout a project’s lifespan in order to fund 
development and deployment.
Sandberg and Aarkikka-Stenroos (2014) show that, for small firms engaged in “radical 
innovation,” difficulties in accessing financing are by far the firms’ largest barrier. 
Similarly, studying carbon capture and storage innovations, Bui et al. (2019) find cost 
and revenue are the most critical elements for firms, noting specifically the need for 
innovators to show a positive return to progress within the context of investment risk. 
Examining renewable energy innovation, Seetharaman et al. (2019) also emphasize risk 
is an important barrier, discussing both the need for sufficient information regarding 
benefits and the need to reduce other uncertainties related to financial feasibility. Gegg 
et al. (2015) find much the same when reviewing the commercialization of aviation 
biofuels in Europe, suggesting that commercialization requires significant de-risking by 
demonstrating both profitability and reduced environmental impact.
These articles, and numerous others, all find that the critical elements on the path 
to commercialization are (1) minimizing risk and (2) demonstrating a sufficiently 
probable and positive return on investment to potential private financiers. Financing 
can come from many sources; a non-exhaustive list includes angel investors (friends 
and family), venture capital, private equity firms, institutional investors and lenders, 
joint venture partners and public capital markets. Individual financiers have different 
preferences over the ventures in which they invest. This is most apparent in comparing 
debt financiers with equity financiers, but it is true of different agents within these 
two classes as well. It also applies to other sources of financing, whether they be joint 
venture partners or those involved in a purely internal (to a firm) budgetary process 
that allocates funding to internal projects. One factor that is generally common in all 
financiers’ preferences, however, is the relationship between expected return and risk.
5 
However, considering private and social benefits in the context of potential export or licensing requires a  
more nuanced approach. When a technology is developed and commercialized in Alberta or Canada, the 
bulk of private and social returns are likely to occur domestically. However, when a technology is exported 
and licensed, a large proportion of the social (non-private) benefits will likely accrue in other jurisdictions. 
This raises a broader question about the economic efficiency of government supports for cleantech. If we 
consider this in the context of cleantech subsidies or other financial support deriving from public sources, 
there is an intuitive, albeit normative, argument that Alberta’s public funds should not be supporting social 
returns in other jurisdictions (even if they are accompanied by private returns in Alberta). To the extent that 
exporting Canadian cleantech reduces global emissions via its use in other countries, Canadians also benefit 
from lower global emissions.
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Ex ante, the return on investment for any project is unknown, or at least not known 
with certainty. However, in deciding where to allocate funds, financiers (implicitly 
or explicitly) assign an expected return and a perceived risk to a project. Consider a 
financier who makes several projections about the return on investment for a project, 
each based on different scenarios with different likelihoods. The expected return is 
a weighted average (mean) of these projected returns, while the perceived risk is 
analogous to the variance or standard deviation between them. Generally, the higher 
the perceived risk, the higher the expected return required to motivate a financier to 
finance a project. 
Generally, as a project moves through the development phase, the return on investment 
becomes more certain. Early stages of development prove the technology at bench-
scale. Field demonstrations and pilots improve the certainty of technology risk, start 
providing some certainty of commercial-scale viability and potentially even alleviate 
some of the project’s economic risk. The ultimate goal of pre-commercialization 
activities is to prove that a technology works and to demonstrate to financiers that 
it is cost effective and can generate a sufficiently positive return on investment with 
sufficient certainty.
Meijer et al. (2019), reviewing the Dutch experience with sustainable energy 
innovations, find that banks impose higher interest rates and investors demand higher 
returns from sustainable energy proponents. This is due to higher perceived risks of 
investing in the sector. Identified risks are direct financial risks (inherently high in any 
pre-commercial venture), technological risks (will the technology scale at a reasonable 
cost?), reputational risks (by definition, start-ups lack an established reputation), and 
legal risks (existing legislation may have an unforeseen impact on commercialization). 
Additionally, potential financiers also required proponents to present more evidence of 
feasibility. That is, financiers required that proponents demonstrate de-risking in terms 
of technology (technical feasibility) and economics (positive profits, market exists).6
Key to this process is the change in perceived risk on the financiers’ part. If the project 
proponent’s actions do not clearly demonstrate increased certainty of a positive 
return, then their efforts in de-risking an innovation will be fruitless. It is important to 
distinguish between “inherent risk” (objective risk) and “perceived risk” (subjective 
risk). A proponent’s de-risking actions can influence a project’s inherent risks. These 
actions will only attract financing if the proponent communicates the reduction in 
inherent risk to potential financiers and by extension becomes a reduction in perceived 
risk. Gegg et al. (2015), studying European aviation biofuels, find that more confidence 
from investors leads to more investment and by extension, a faster uptake.
Figure 1 demonstrates a general relationship between certainty and expected return 
on investment for a financier. Each class of financier will have different preferences 
over risk and return, which in turn will imply a different shape and location for the 
demarcation between the green “investment range” and the red “non-investment 
range.” For all financiers, the dashed demarcation line will slope downward, indicating  
a trade-off between the certainty and expected return of a potential investment. 
6 
This process is often referred to as a “due diligence review.”
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Figure 1: Risk-Reward Trade-off for Investors
In addition to financiers’ risk-reward preferences, their preferences relating to 
the size of an investment are also critical in understanding the innovation and 
commercialization process. Recall that risk is conceptually identical to the variance in 
projected returns under different scenarios. A financier’s risk-reward preferences do 
not just apply to a specific project, but also in aggregate across their entire portfolio. 
When we consider risk in a portfolio, we are essentially talking about the weighted 
variance of the portfolio, with weights defined by the position (value) of each individual 
holding. Because of this, a financier with many small investments (such as a venture 
capital fund) has a more diversified portfolio, and therefore faces lower aggregate risk, 
compared to a financier with a more concentrated portfolio (fewer, larger holdings).7 
Venture capital portfolios tend to have a large number of investments in order to 
increase the probability of a positive outcome for the portfolio as a whole (Ghosh and 
Nanda 2010).
This has important implications for financing innovation projects, especially those 
in petroleum cleantech, since each stage of de-risking tends to require a significant 
increase in required capital. At early “proof of concept” stages (bench and lab tests, 
intended to demonstrate a viable technology) the capital requirements are relatively 
low, which lets financiers tolerate higher individual project risk since they can 
effectively hedge individual projects against each other. As a project moves to later 
7 
The relationship between increased diversification and reductions in aggregate risk (variance) holds as long  
as the projected returns for each holding in the portfolio are not highly correlated with each other.
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stages of de-risking (up to and including a commercial-scale demonstration plant), the 
capital requirements grow, which in turn generally reduces the potential financiers’ 
tolerance for risk.
The amount of funding required to commercialize an innovation is generally beyond 
the scale that venture capital is willing to provide. As a result, venture capital tends to 
exit as a viable financing source before an innovation gets to the commercial stage. 
This creates a potential funding gap, the so-called “valley of death” (Ghosh and Nanda 
2010). In the energy industry, financing gaps are especially acute between the piloting 
stage and the realization of first sales (Globe Capital 2019).
Therefore, the relationship between the rate at which an innovation is de-risked 
and the rate at which its capital requirements grow is a critical determinant of an 
innovation project’s ability to raise financing on its journey toward commercialization. 
Furthermore, the innovation proponent must not only de-risk, but must also be able 
to demonstrate clearly to a potential financier that it has in fact de-risked sufficiently. 
If a financier cannot be convinced of the reduction in risk, then it will not adjust its 
behaviour accordingly.
While the above discussion references venture capital and other outside financiers 
specifically, the same types of incentives exist for any project. Even an innovation 
project that is developed in-house, using budget allocations from a large producer, 
faces the same risk-reward concerns and the same trade-offs. A firm engaging in 
internal innovation is likely to have a larger number of earlier stage projects, which it 
would cull in later stages, in order to focus on projects with lower risk-reward ratios. 
Later-stage innovation projects (those closer to commercialization) require more 
capital and therefore take up a larger share of any portfolio (internal or external) that 
finances them. The later the stage of the project, the lower risk it must be in order to 
secure or maintain continued financing or budget allocation.
This is the context through which we discuss factors that limit or promote effective 
commercialization of cleantech innovations in Alberta’s petroleum industry.
KEY FACTORS IN ACCESSING CLEANTECH FINANCING IN 
ALBERTA’S PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
Through a review of ongoing cleantech innovation in Alberta’s petroleum industry, 
we identify a core of nine related factors fundamental to accessing and maintaining 
innovation financing in the sector. We also note that there are hurdles commonly 
afflicting cleantech innovation that do not apply to Alberta’s petroleum industry. We 
discuss each of these in turn.
NECESSITY OF PRE-COMMERCIAL DUE DILIGENCE TO DE-RISK
As we note above, pre-commercial de-risking is critical to innovation projects 
maintaining continued financing. A core reason for this, not articulated above, is that 
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the initial task of the innovation process is formation of intangible capital8 (Bloom et al. 
2019). Intangible capital has little or no perceived salvage value should the innovation 
project fail to commercialize, increasing the downside risk of the project relative to 
standard capital formation. In effect, a pre-commercial innovation project represents a 
negative cash flow with a perceived all-or-nothing outcome. Any financing committed 
to the project represents a sunk cost, so if the innovation is not suitable for deployment 
or otherwise not economic, all of that value is lost.
Furthermore, even if the innovation proves to be commercial, the financiers’ interest is 
to shorten or truncate the de-risking process. Not only do they want innovations de-
risked, they want it done quickly. If commercialization takes too long, funding agencies 
and investors can become impatient and stop funding the innovation’s progress. 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) document bias among venture capital funds towards 
projects that have three- to five-year returns, linked to the compensation structure for 
venture capital fund managers. Anecdotally, other institutional investors have a similar 
bias for shorter-term investments (seven, or at the outside 10 years). 
Outside of these investor-specific preferences, proponents’ and financiers’ incentives 
for expedited de-risking can be clearly illustrated by considering its effect on the 
discounted cash flow of an innovation project. Holding constant the total up-front 
cost to de-risk and the eventual value of commercialization, each delay in reaching 
commercialization reduces the net present value of the project because the financiers 
and proponent must wait longer for positive cash flows. Figure 2 shows a stylized 
version of this relationship.
Figure 2: The Relationship between a Commercialization Timeline and the Net Present 
Value (NPV) for Pre-Commercial Finance
8 
Intangible capital is any capital asset that lacks physical substance. Examples of tangible capital assets  
include equipment and structures; an example of intangible capital is any piece of intellectual property 
(sometimes embodied by a held patent, although this is not necessary).
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The resulting incentive is for early financiers to prefer that de-risking occur more 
quickly. This is not an issue if done properly; however, there is a potential problem 
if the drive to expedite de-risking compromises the de-risking process. It also raises 
a credibility issue in accessing future financing. If de-risking is expedited and is 
inadequate (or, more importantly, if there is a perception of insufficient de-risking), 
then an innovation project will be unable to access additional financing needed in 
later stages. The eventual outcome is that commercialization can take longer (or fail to 
happen altogether) because of early-stage rushing.
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND SIGNALLING INCENTIVES FOR SMALL START-UPS
In de-risking for commercialization, an innovation proponent needs to establish that 
the technology works, that it is economical and can provide a return and that it will be 
able to achieve sufficient market penetration to realize that return. This then needs to 
be clearly and credibly communicated to potential financiers. The proponent has better 
information than financiers (the information asymmetry). The innovation proponent’s 
credibility is the critical element here. If the proponent is credible, and if technology 
de-risking is well documented and articulated to investors, then it is possible to access 
later-stage financing. 
Lindgren and Hallberg (2016) examine the “black pellet”9 technology innovation, 
finding that the proponent lacked credibility due to its incomplete grasp of the 
innovation’s full commercial potential. This was a key factor in limiting access to later-
stage financing. They note that this is less of a problem for larger firms, as they can 
leverage general knowledge and expertise to illustrate credibility for individual projects.
Similar to the incentive to move quickly (as discussed above), smaller firms also have 
an incentive to overvalue their innovations and by extension, the firm itself. This 
incentive arises if initial-innovation proponents who control the firm want to maintain 
a controlling interest. The result is that start-ups in search of capital may overvalue 
themselves in order to raise additional financing without giving up controlling interest. 
This represents a critical danger to commercialization since a start-up that overvalues 
itself will face a capital market unwilling to agree to the implied financing terms. The 
problem can then snowball, as the longer it takes a start-up to raise additional capital, 
the more that signals to potential financiers that the start-up is a poor investment. 
Eventually, the start-up can lose momentum and the market will move on, labelling the 
innovation as a failure.
When attempting to attract equity financing, the need or desire to protect a firm’s 
intellectual property also constitutes a potential barrier to funding. To motivate 
investors to provide financing, a firm must clearly communicate its efforts to de-risk, 
which likely implies sharing significant information about the nature of the developing 
innovation. However, this is at odds with the firm’s interests in protecting its intellectual 
property (IP). The result is a necessity to balance secrecy and communication in order 
to establish de-risking efforts while sufficiently protecting valuable IP.
9 
The “black pellet” technology is a processed bioenergy product intended to act as a substitute for traditional 
hydrocarbons in energy storage/production.
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THE “CHICKEN AND EGG” FINANCING PROBLEM 
For a mature firm engaged in traditional (non-innovation-related) capital formation, the 
credibility problem is less acute; firms are able to leverage existing financing in order 
to access additional financing. Once a firm can demonstrate that it is able to access 
capital (regardless of the level of risk aversion inherent in the capital source), it can then 
use that financing as evidence of reduced risk when searching for additional financing.
In early stages of development, cleantech is generally deemed too risky to attract debt 
financing. As discussed above, this implies a reliance on venture capital for innovation 
start-ups and funding from general budget allocations for innovation within larger 
incumbent firms (Ghosh and Nanda 2010). Angel investors (family and friends or the 
proponents themselves) are also heavily relied on for initial financing.
Government grants often play a substantial role in fostering early growth in cleantech 
innovations; however, they come with an unintended consequence. Persistent use of 
government grants may signal to the market that the economics of a project are not 
strong.
Government grants by their nature do not require any repayment; as such, there is 
no guarantee for later-stage investors that the vetting process associated with these 
grants is informative about the market risk of the underlying innovation project.10 
Despite this, government grants are not “dumb money” and granting agencies 
generally have due-diligence standards and make comprehensive assessments. In our 
review of the industry, however, it is clear that potential private sector financiers do not 
regard government funding as a strong signal of quality, likely because the terms of 
these grants do not explicitly align the incentives of the funding source with the project 
proponent. That is, there is no implied direct financial gain to the funding agency 
(government) associated with the project’s success. Because of this, proponents’ 
ability to attract grants might not be regarded as a strong signal.11 This is in contrast 
to conventional equity or debt financing, where there is an explicit financial return 
contingent on the commercial success of the proponent’s innovation program.
Therefore, firms that rely heavily on government grants or angel investors may fall into 
a trap, wherein private financiers do not view existing funding as a signal of potential 
merit. This limits a proponent’s ability to leverage additional financing, giving rise 
to a chicken-and-egg problem where the only solution is to find a way to credibly 
communicate to debt or equity financiers that the innovation is sufficiently low risk.
Some government granting agencies require that a proponent raise private sector 
financing in order to access matching funds through a grant program. This has the 
10 
Interest-free loans (although not loan guarantees) are exceptions since the granting agency still requires 
payback of the principal. But even in the case of interest-free loans there is no requirement that the project 
earn a positive return, only that it breaks even (nominally).
11 
The argument behind this assertion is well-established in signalling theory and derives from Spence (1978). 
The core issue is that if the government (the party issuing the grant) has no financial stake in the project’s 
outcome, then the grant itself may be a weak or uninformative signal of the government’s favourable 
assessment of the project. There is also substantial anecdotal evidence of governments’ inability to “pick 
winners,” which further dilutes the signalling value of government support.
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merit of encouraging proponents to search for private sector financing (in order to 
avoid the potential funding trap described above). However, this can constitute a 
different type of hurdle for innovation since a proponent’s potential inability to access 
private sector financing early on can also bar it from accessing non-dilutive grant-
based financing. Hence, another chicken-and-egg problem: a firm may be unable to 
access a grant program, because it cannot access private sector financing, but may be 
unable to access private sector financing because it lacks financing to sufficiently de-
risk an innovation.
A potential solution to some of these issues would be for funding agencies to better 
communicate the due-diligence activities surrounding their funding allocation 
decisions. This kind of communication would require carefully defined terms of 
reference, since there are likely liability and other legal issues if a government agency is 
viewed as providing investing advice. However, clearly communicating and expositing 
the process and outcome of funding agency due diligence could go a long way 
towards correcting the view of government funding as “dumb money.” Further to this 
point, for this to be most effective the reporting needs to be consistent across funding 
applications. That is, disclosure of due-diligence activities would be most effective if it 
happened across both successful and failed funding applications.
BUSINESS COMPETENCIES OF INNOVATION PROPONENTS
In the preceding text, we made multiple references to the need for innovation 
proponents to communicate clearly to investors. The market for capital is very broad 
and capital itself is very mobile; innovation proponents compete with a very broad 
range of potential investments in trying to attract capital. Effective communication is 
paramount to these efforts. Often the proponents who best understand an innovation 
have significant expertise in science and engineering, but limited expertise in 
economics and business. 
Reviewing technology commercialization in the Dutch cleantech sector, Meijer et al. 
(2019) find that a subset of proponents lacked sufficient project management skills 
and had not clearly developed (let alone communicated) a strategy for the long-term 
commercialization process. Similarly, in a systematic meta-analysis of radical innovation 
projects, Sandberg and Aarkikka-Stenroos (2014) note the importance of innovation 
proponent competencies related to incubation, and acceleration and commercialization.
Simply put, successful commercialization requires that innovation proponents develop 
or acquire sufficient expertise in assessing and communicating the investment potential 
of their innovations. That is, they must show that the technology works (or will work, 
with reasonable certainty) at scale, show that it is economically viable (provides a 
private return on investment) and that there is a credible plan to access sufficient 
market share to deliver a return to investors. Related to this last point, the size of 
the market for an innovation and an innovator’s ability to achieve sufficient market 
penetration are large concerns in their own right.
Also notable here is that managerial competencies required of a cleantech innovation 
program vary significantly throughout the development process. Early on, scientific 
and engineering literacy and experience are critical. As the project grows, more 
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managerial expertise is required. Financing and business development skills are 
required at the commercialization stage. As discussed, the type and source of financing 
are likely to vary throughout the program’s development. This implies that one 
contributor to success may be the flexibility of program governance to ensure that 
specific skills are reflected in the program management team at the appropriate time in 
the development process.
THE MARKET FOR AN INNOVATION: GREENFIELD VS. BROWNFIELD
The process of innovation requires a substantial up-front fixed cost in the form of 
negative cash flow (already discussed above) required in developing and de-risking the 
innovation. Once the innovation is proven, its value is as intellectual property, but that 
value is driven by how useful and how extensively used the innovation is. While there 
are significant capital costs to deployment, as incremental deployment occurs, the 
upfront cost can effectively be amortized over a larger and larger market share. That 
is, the average cost for the first deployment is high because it includes all the upfront 
development costs, but the average cost falls with every additional unit since the 
development costs are only incurred once.
In every case, there is a minimum effective scale for technology adoption, below which 
the average cost is too high (from a social standpoint) to justify the initial fixed costs 
associated with development (Figure 3). Adoption below the minimum efficient scale 
implies ineffective commercialization (in the sense we defined above), further implying 
that the project should have been abandoned earlier than the commercialization phase. 
Adoption above the minimum efficient scale implies effective commercialization and 
suggests that the project should be commercialized. Therefore, successful effective 
commercialization requires both a sufficiently large market and sufficient penetration of 
that market.12
Figure 3: Ineffective vs. Effective Rates of Innovation Adoption due to Economies of Scale
12 
While this is a stylized representation of the economics of technology innovation, the concept represented 
here is widely if not universally applicable across industries. The core logic is that the cost of technology 
innovation (not including implementation) does not vary with overall adoption. This in turn implies economies 
of scale in adoption, regardless of the specific industry under consideration.
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In evaluating the market for cleantech in Alberta’s petroleum sector, there are two 
paramount issues: (1) the nature of an innovation in supporting greenfield or brownfield 
deployment and (2) market access for the sector as a whole (the much-discussed 
pipeline issue).
In the current environment, oil exports are constrained by pipeline capacity (all of 
Alberta’s export pipelines currently operate at or near capacity), reducing incentives 
for significant production expansions. Greenfield development in the oil sands is less 
likely, as any greenfield investment would add significant production to a region that 
is already oversupplied. Absent a significant increase in takeaway capacity — either 
through policies to support crude-by-rail, or through additions of export pipeline 
capacity — brownfield investments are a more credible strategy and more likely buyers 
of cleantech. Commercial incentives and social benefits of cleantech do not just apply 
to expanded production (marginal output); they also apply to current production 
(infra-marginal production). As such, market access concerns may limit incentives/
opportunities at the margin but should not be an overwhelming concern for cleantech 
innovations in Alberta in general.
Without additional market access, innovations that can be implemented as brownfield 
investments will generally be less risky than those that can only be implemented as 
greenfield investments. Better still are innovations implementable in either brownfield 
or greenfield sites as these have the widest potential uptake. For innovations targeted 
at brownfield operations, whether the innovation is specific to mining or in-situ 
operations will also determine the potential market; of the province’s 27 active oil sands 
projects, six are mining and 21 are in situ (Fellows et al. 2017).
Furthermore, the January 2021 rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline (actioned by U.S. 
President Joe Biden’s decision to rescind the project’s presidential permit) illustrates 
that domestic policymakers may have little control over market access. While policy 
choices related to market access are an important area of policy development, the 
interests of cleantech innovation are likely much better served by policies over which 
domestic policymakers and proponents can exercise more control.
To illustrate the potential for effective commercialization and attract later-stage 
financing, proponents need to develop and communicate a plan to attain the 
required scale. It is not enough to show an economic technology and a large potential 
market. Proponents need to demonstrate a plan for accessing a sufficient portion 
of that market to generate a positive return on investment. This is a critical element 
in attracting financing and it requires a proponent to have expertise in business or 
economics and communication of the same. Such plans need to show either that an 
innovation can augment existing brownfield or planned greenfield capital investments 
in a way that is attractive to producers, or that the innovation can successfully supplant 
an existing technology with enough uptake by producers.
Technology “lock-in” is a concern here. It is entirely possible for an innovation to 
promote a higher return than existing technology and yet fail to be adopted. If firms 
adopt a lower-return technology first, when presented with an innovation that would 
carry a higher return, firms may fail to adopt it because they have already incurred a 
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now-sunk cost implementing the lower-return technology. The bar for an innovation 
supplanting an established technology becomes much higher (in terms of the 
promised return on investment) compared to an innovation that augments established 
technologies. This strengthens the already acknowledged incentive to expedite the 
innovation process in order to get to a commercialization phase earlier, since this 
reduces the potential that an innovation is denied commercialization due to tech lock-
in. All the same, when expediting innovation, an innovation proponent must still be 
diligent in de-risking and communicating de-risking to financiers. 
THE OVERALL INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR CLEANTECH IN CANADA’S 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
The macroeconomic climate and the state of the Alberta and Canadian petroleum 
industry affect investment in any type of innovation, including cleantech. Reduced 
profits for an oil and gas firm means reduced availability of net positive cash flow to 
fund cleantech innovations (George et al. 2016). When rationalizing investments in a 
period of declining profits, oil and gas firms focus on investments with stronger proven 
returns, which can have the consequence of de-emphasizing cleantech opportunities 
in capital plans (George et al. 2016). Seetharaman et al. (2019) observe that both 
government and firm-level support for cleantech innovations declines in economic 
downturns: rather than government support acting as a substitute for declining private 
support, both end up being pro-cyclical.
In the wake of the 2014 global oil price fall and current pipeline capacity constraints 
in Alberta, as well as current and lingering effects from the COVID-19 pandemic, firms 
may not have sufficient free cash flow to support cleantech innovations. Further, the 
provincial government may not be willing to sufficiently support cleantech innovations 
given its own reduced revenues.13
Expectations about prices in Alberta and outside markets may also play a significant 
role, depending on the nature of the innovation. Some innovations require a specific 
price differential to be economic. As an example, bitumen partial-upgrading 
technologies require some combination of (1) a bitumen to heavy oil crude differential 
and (2) a sufficiently high diluent price to be economical. As uncertainty about 
petroleum prices increases, or as the expected value of any critical differential falls, a 
cleantech innovation specific to the petroleum industry may become harder to finance 
and commercialize.
EMISSIONS POLICIES, THE MARKET FOR CARBON AND OVERALL IMPACTS ON 
ADOPTION ECONOMICS
From a potential adopter’s perspective, cleantech innovation provides economic and 
environmental benefits. For example, an innovation that reduces the steam-to-oil 
13 
Public opposition to subsidies to oil and gas or fossil fuel companies (see, for example, Environmental  
Defence 2018) may also play a role here, though there is also general support for government support of 
cleantech investment (see, for example, Abacus Data 2018). These opposing public views may influence 
government policy. 
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ratio for an in-situ oil sands operation delivers an economic benefit in that less energy 
is needed to produce steam (per barrel of bitumen production) and an associated 
environmental benefit, since less natural gas is burned to deliver the reduced quantity 
of steam, which results in fewer greenhouse gas emissions. In the presence of explicit 
emissions pricing, that environmental benefit is also an economic benefit.
Innovation proponents need to articulate the economic benefits of an innovation 
separately from the environmental benefits. It is also important to be explicit about 
whether environmental benefits are the primary value of the innovation or simply 
incidental in the search for other direct economic benefits.14 If an environmental 
benefit is the primary value proposition of the innovation, this will generally signal a 
vulnerability to policy-based risk. Consider a technology that reduces greenhouse 
gas emissions but delivers little or no other benefit. The future financial value of such 
an innovation is then very sensitive to any changes in emissions pricing or related 
regulations. Contrast this with an innovation that has a value proposition primarily 
based on cost reduction with an ancillary environmental benefit. The future financial 
viability of this second innovation is much less sensitive to regulatory, policy or 
legislative changes. Clearly identifying a gap in existing processes or in compliancy 
with existing or impending regulation or legislation can make a significant contribution 
to commercialization efforts, but it is not a necessary condition for commercialization.
Government policy, regulations and legislation have a predominant role in aligning 
economic and environmental incentives. More specifically, regulations and legislation 
can be used to turn an environmental benefit into an economic one either by subsidizing 
environmental benefits or by penalizing environmental damages. Economic benefits can 
flow from an innovation’s environmental benefits, but these will depend on policy.
A potential adopter will generally only be interested in an innovation’s economic 
benefits. The exception is if the firm expects a positive reputational effect from 
involvement in or adoption of cleantech. Absent some regulation or legislation 
mandating or incentivizing the environmental benefit, there may be insufficient 
incentive for firms to adopt cleantech innovations based solely on improved 
environmental impacts. The most prominent example is provincial and federal 
implementation of emissions pricing, which provides a direct return per tonne of 
emissions reduced by an adopted innovation. This aligns (to a certain extent) the 
private economic benefits of a cleantech innovation with the innovation’s environmental 
benefits (at least, those associated with emissions reductions).
However, as Jones (2015) notes, risks of significant policy changes translate directly 
into commercialization risks for cleantech innovation proponents. If the emissions price 
is not known with relative certainty, then there is increased variance (increased risk) in 
the expected return on a cleantech innovation.15 As indicated above, an increase in risk 
is counterproductive to commercialization efforts.
14 
Partial-upgrading technology is an example of this. Some of the technologies developed in this category will 
lead to overall emissions reductions (across the value chain). Yet such reductions are not the goal driving 
these innovations and are incidental rather than sought after in the innovation process.
15 
This is true of all policy, but environmental policy risk is specific to cleantech.
17
REPUTATION AND INVESTOR SENTIMENT
Beyond the risk-reward context discussed above, investor sentiment towards the 
sector is also important in attracting innovation financing. Among investors looking 
for “green” sectors to invest in, Alberta’s petroleum industry is not perceived as 
attractive, given its reputation (deserved or not) as a “dirty” sector. Green investors 
with a preference for projects with little or no environmental footprint will look to other 
sectors. At an extreme level, industry efforts to reduce the negative environmental 
consequences of production can actually drive these investors away. George et al. 
(2016) note that oil and gas companies attempting to communicate sustainability 
efforts to investors can face accusations of “green-washing”: under-representing their 
environmental footprint or over-representing their efforts to mitigate that footprint. If 
investors perceive a firm is cynical (rather than earnest) in its actions, they may look 
elsewhere to invest.
This is a more acute issue for small start-up firms than it is for larger producers, as 
start-ups rely entirely on new financiers rather than incumbent investors. However, 
even for large firms, the general sentiment of investors still matters. Regardless of the 
actual risk and return on investment, if investors are uninterested in financing a specific 
firm because of an unrelated preference for clean sectors, then that firm will have more 
difficulty in raising and maintaining innovation financing.
It is worth mentioning here that these investor sentiments are representative of wider 
public sentiment as well, and this broader public preference can make it difficult for 
governments to provide public financing support for cleantech innovation in the oil 
and gas sector. It is reasonable to extend the conclusions by George et al. (2016) from 
investors to the voting public. The resulting assertion is that the portion of the public 
that supports efforts to reduce emissions may oppose any additional subsidies of the 
oil and gas sector (even if those subsidies deliver reduced emissions). As a corollary, 
the portion of the public supportive of the oil and gas industry may be disinterested in 
any subsidies provided to achieve climate ambitions.
The reputation of the innovation proponent or the type of innovation also matters. 
If the proponent or the type of innovation has a reputation for cost overruns, this 
can cause financiers to look elsewhere. A reputation for cost overruns can be very 
pernicious and hard to correct. There is also a “free rider” problem, as one proponent 
is potentially able to damage or ruin the reputation of all firms in a particular innovation 
space if they are dishonest (or just personally poorly informed) about their own 
development and deployment costs.
Finally, policy and political risk also matter for investor sentiment. Baker, Bloom and 
Davis (2016) show that policy uncertainty reduces investment and employment 
in policy-sensitive sectors; cleantech is arguably policy sensitive. Political climate 
and associated policy decisions can therefore influence investment and investor 
decisions. To the extent that governments are perceived as “unfriendly” to foreign 
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direct investment (FDI)16 or indifferent/unsupportive to cleantech innovation, this will 
dissuade investors and reduce options for cleantech firms, also reducing options for 
cleantech adopters.
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Related closely to the need for pre-commercial diligence to de-risk is the onus on 
proponents to reduce risk associated with regulatory processes. Regulatory requirements 
for petroleum sector projects differ significantly depending on the project’s stage. 
Commercial (or “non-experimental”) applications require more approvals, and face more 
scrutiny and longer review timelines. In Alberta, for example, application-processing 
timelines alone (not including potential interrogatories and public hearings) could range 
from 14 business days or less for an application for minor modifications to an oil sands 
project (brownfield application), to upwards of 1,900 business days for a new oil sands 
(greenfield) commercial scheme (AER 2019). As institutional investor bias leans towards 
projects achieving returns within 10 years, as discussed above, it is critical for proponents 
to have an early and strong grasp of regulatory requirements and associated timeframes 
and factor this into their plans for deployment. 
More broadly, regulations may act as a barrier to cleantech deployment in three 
additional ways. First, a lack of, or ineffective, regulations allowing for uptake of 
solutions by the target market may hinder demand for the innovation. Second, where 
an innovation is a new technology with no close comparators, the applicable regulatory 
framework may be unclear, adding time and uncertainty to the regulatory review 
process. Third, when the market for the technology is reliant on government policy or 
regulation, perceived risk of changes to the policy or regulation may hinder investment. 
Lindgren and Hallberg (2016) identify regulatory risk as one of the four forms of risk 
to pre-commercial renewable technology that policymakers can reduce, defined as 
when a change in government priorities has an influence on the market. They argue 
policymakers can influence industry growth by encouraging rivalry among competitors 
or supporting new technologies with beneficial policies such as regulating substitutes 
for existing technologies. Distortionary fiscal and regulatory policies may also restrain 
the use of emissions-reduction technologies, as seen with conventional oil and gas R&D 
subsidies hindering uptake of clean energy technologies (Brown 2001; Polzin 2017).
Uncertainty about how regulations will be applied, or whether regulations may change 
also hinders investment. Polzin (2017) finds banks refrain from lending to clean energy 
ventures too heavily dependent on policies. In their assessment of critical barriers to 
alternative and renewable fuel and vehicle deployment, Burke et al. (2016) find that the 
top barrier to investment in biofuels is policy uncertainty, e.g., how long a policy may 
remain in effect. Policy uncertainty affects revenue predictability and profitability. 
Of course, regulations may act as an enabler of cleantech deployment; for example, 
through creating a market for the technology or enabling government investment. 
16 
For example, Canada’s requirements to review “significant investments” by non-Canadians under the 
Investment Canada Act are a deterrent to FDI. Canada’s political relationships also matter; specifically, 
geopolitical tensions with China are correlated with lower Chinese investment in Canada (Snyder 2020).
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However, government policy support may not keep pace with technical advancements, 
or the industry may not have reached the critical mass needed to trigger regulatory 
reform to accommodate its growth. Studying the commercialization of cleantech in the 
Netherlands, Meijer et al. (2019) find the relative newness of the sustainability sector 
posed barriers to government support and regulation of the sector. 
COMMON INNOVATION PROBLEMS ABSENT FROM ALBERTA’S  
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
In our review of the existing literature on barriers to the commercialization of 
cleantech, we found three additional themes that seem common to a large proportion 
of cleantech innovation but do not afflict the Alberta petroleum industry. It is worth 
briefly commenting on these before we conclude.
First, Jones (2015) and others find that a lack of human capital can be a limiting 
factor in cleantech innovation, which generally requires skilled engineers and project 
managers. We find no evidence of this as a limiting factor in Alberta. This may be a 
consequence of the 2014 oil price crash, or because firms in the Alberta petroleum 
space have an established history of innovation beyond cleantech, both of which would 
lead to a stock of available human capital supporting a healthy innovation ecosystem. 
Regardless of the specific reason, the skills of Alberta’s existing workforce translate 
well to cleantech innovation.
Second, Flamos et al. (2008) and Suzuki (2015) note that established consumer 
preferences for pre-existing products can limit proliferation of cleantech. However, this 
observation is driven by product consumers rather than technology consumers (whom 
we refer to as “potential adopters”). In effect, products produced by the Alberta 
petroleum sector are unlikely to change dramatically (if at all) because of cleantech 
adoption. This consumer-side issue is inapplicable in our context.
Finally, for smaller economies searching for foreign financiers, inflation rate and 
exchange rate risk can be an issue (Jones 2015). Increased inflation (relative to 
expectations) can quickly reduce the real return on an investment for a given nominal 
return. Accordingly, exchange rate volatility makes repatriated returns on an investment 
more volatile (and by extension more risky) for foreign investors. Regardless of its 
other implications, Canada’s central bank has a recognized reputation for providing 
very stable and predictable levels of inflation. However, there is a trade-off where 
stronger Canadian controls on inflation mean increased (Canada-U.S.) exchange rate 
volatility (Globerman and Storer 2005). Yet, anecdotally, it seems that this exchange 
rate volatility has not translated into a serious concern for cleantech innovation. 
Nevertheless, this may require additional inquiry and attention.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given the range and diversity of factors we discuss above, it is difficult to synthesize 
a central thesis from our review. Instead, we focus on three themes that emerge from 
the discussion.
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First, in evaluating policies to support successful innovation in Alberta’s and Canada’s 
petroleum industry, we must clearly differentiate between start-up and scale-up. The 
need to sufficiently de-risk and develop innovations underlies much of the discussion 
above. The incentives of an innovation proponent to accelerate its development and 
reach commercialization more quickly are well understood. This rush to the finish line, 
however, can have unintended and detrimental consequences. Innovation supports at 
the start-up phase should be focused on fostering innovation that has strong potential 
for effective commercialization whereas scale-up should rely on demonstrated 
strengths to obtain private sector support for growth.
A considered and methodical approach to accelerating innovation, rather than 
following the impulse to cut corners and expedite certain aspects of the development 
process, ensures appropriate due diligence and de-risking. Policy to accelerate 
innovation is best implemented by finding ways to support innovation and de-risking. 
While supporting innovation does not exclusively imply capital provision, in our analysis 
of this market it appears that access to capital is the most critical bottleneck. It is 
important to navigate the stages of innovation and the related capital finance process 
in a more considered and efficient fashion rather than focusing solely on simplifying or 
expediting that process.
Second, all parties need to recognize the importance and role of non-dilutive funding 
(specifically government grants). Funding agencies conduct methodical reviews 
and similar due diligence, which can be leveraged as a signal to private financiers 
who currently seem to consider government grants as “dumb money” that provides 
no signal of investment quality. There is scope for an increased communications 
role from those funding agencies, communicating their degree of diligence to 
potential later-stage financiers. There is also an onus on proponents. All financing, 
particularly government grants, needs to be effectively managed and efficiently 
spent. Furthermore, these decisions and the overall quality of management of existing 
financing need to be clearly communicated to potential financiers.
Finally, though the discussion above has used the context of innovation programs, 
more analysis is needed on firm-level determinants of successful innovation rather than 
program-level determinants. Compared to project-level financing, firm-level supports 
can foster a more efficient allocation of resources between projects. Under a project-
level financing arrangement, financing does not continue after a projected is cancelled, 
so firms have an incentive to direct resources towards projects that can secure initial 
financing, or have already done so, rather than projects with the most merit. While 
there may be overlap between these two, this overlap is not complete and firms should 
constantly evaluate the potential merit of their innovation project profiles.
We also discussed the definition of effective commercialization with an implication that 
not all innovations should reach commercialization. Freedom to fail, and fail quickly, 
is at least as important here as freedom to succeed. The longer non-commercial 
innovations or those with negative net social benefit are allowed to develop, the more 
financing they divert from more productive uses. This is inefficient and ineffective.
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When assessing policies and tools to support effective commercialization, firms, 
granting agencies and policymakers should consider policies that support the failure 
of innovation programs that should not reach commercialization. This conversation is 
best at a firm level, rather than a program level, since effectively managed firm-level 
financing provides both freedom to succeed and freedom to fail. Policies can support 
a firm failing to commercialize and innovation (where appropriate) but once a program 
fails, there is by definition nothing left to support.
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APPENDIX: PROJECTS COVERED IN THE REVIEW
Table 1 - Innovation Projects Summary










DSU® is a sulphur-removal and upgrading 
technology that produces marine fuel from 
heavy oil feedstock. The technology “uses 
molten sodium to significantly reduce 
the levels of sulphur, metals, acid (TAN) 
and asphaltenes in heavy oil feedstocks, 
including oil sands bitumen” (Field 
Upgrading n.d.).
Creating Value from 




Oil sands tailings 
management
Oil sands mine 
operators
CVW™ “remediates oil sands froth 
treatment tailings, recovering contained 
valuable minerals and hydrocarbons 
(bitumen, diluent),” resulting in significant 
GHG emissions avoidance and other air 




Extraction) pilot, phase 3
MEG Energy Improved in-situ 
extraction
Oil sands in-situ 
operators
The technology “involves infill wells and 
the injection of a light hydrocarbon instead 
of steam after initial SAGD operation when 
bitumen recovery reaches between 20-









Oil sands in-situ 
operators
The ESEIEH™ technology preheats a 
bitumen reservoir with electromagnetic 
energy and uses “a light hydrocarbon 
solvent to mobilize and recover the 
bitumen” (Emissions Reduction Alberta 
n.d.-a).






Oil sands mine 
operators
An alternative bitumen extraction method 
that involves a relocatable, modular 
extraction plant that processes ore and 
separates bitumen right in the mine pit.
N-Solv BEST Oil Sands 
Scale-Up Project
N-Solv Corporation Improved in-situ 
extraction
Oil sands in-situ 
operators
Warm propane or butane is “injected as 
a vapor and condenses underground, 
washing the valuable compounds out of 
the bitumen” Emissions Reduction Alberta 
(n.d.-b).
Sources: Canadian Natural Resources Limited (2018); Emissions Reduction Alberta (2018, n.d. a, b); Field 
Upgrading (n.d.); Government of Canada (n.d. a, b). 
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